



*Presented to:*

**System Safety Society (SSS)  
Tennessee Valley Chapter**

***SED Software  
Airworthiness & Safety  
Lab (SASL) SW Safety  
Analyses***

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***TECHNOLOGY DRIVEN. WARFIGHTER FOCUSED.***

*Presented by:*

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- **SED Software Airworthiness and Safety Lab (SASL) Introduction**
- **SED SASL Experience**
- **SED SW System Safety Analysis Process (S<sup>4</sup>AP)**
- **SED SASL Objectives**
- **The F-35**
- **SED F-35 Independent Software Safety Analysis Task (ISSAT)**
- **ISSAT Approach**
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## MISSION

- Provide independent supplemental software airworthiness and safety support for aviation and weapons systems, assisting the AED Airworthiness Release and AMCOM Safety Office Software System Safety Technical Review Panel (SSSTRP) processes.

## CORE COMPERENCIES

- Analyze aviation and weapons system software life cycle processes, documents, and code to meet DoD and industry software airworthiness and safety requirements.

## LOCATION

- Located at the SED Redstone Arsenal, Building 6263

## SOFTWARE TOOLS

- Includes a growing set of tools for analyses across the software development lifecycle (LDRA, Simulink, Understand, FaultTree+,...)

## CAPABILITIES


- SED SASL personnel participated in numerous industry working groups
  - MIL-STD-882 Rev E
  - RTCA Special Joint Committee, SC-205 for DO-178C
  - Joint Software System Safety Engineering Handbook Ver. 1.0
  - Joint MIL-HDBK-516 Rev C
- SED SASL has in-house specialized procedures and tools used specifically for analyzing safety-critical embedded software
  - Independent Software Safety Assessment Reports
  - Static Code Analyses, Structural Coverage Analyses
- SED SASL has performed MIL-STD-882 hazard analyses on numerous aviation platforms and weapon systems
  - PHL, PHA, SHA, SSHA, SRCA, FHA, FTA, FMEA
  - Apache, Hellfire, Longbow Launcher, Army UASs, THAAD, Sentinel, JLENS, F-35, IFPC, MML, CH-47

# SED SW System Safety Analysis Process

## SED Software SYSTEM SAFETY ANALYSIS Process (S<sup>4</sup>AP)

SYSTEM and SOFTWARE  
DEVELOPMENT LIFECYCLE

SYSTEM and SOFTWARE  
SAFETY CONTRIBUTIONS



SED SW System Safety Analysis Process provides discipline and rigor

1. Disciplined approach
2. Hazard-based software safety analyses
3. Customer desire for active role/insight to analysis process and results
4. Repeatable analysis processes
5. Analyst consistency
6. Auditable results
7. Automated metrics reporting
8. Automated report generation
9. Consistent status reporting



- The F-35 is the world's most advanced multi-role fighter providing unmatched capabilities to military forces around the world.
- Designed with the entire battle space in mind, the F-35 is the most flexible, technologically sophisticated multirole fighter ever built. By combining advanced stealth designed in from the beginning with fighter speed and agility, fully fused sensor information, network-enabled operations and advanced sustainment, the 5th Generation F-35 delivers innovative capabilities to meet security needs for nations across the world.



Source: <https://www.f35.com/about/fast-facts>  
<https://www.f35.com/media/photos-detail/f-35-fires-first-aim-9x-missile>

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# F-35



Video Source: [http://www.jsf.mil/gallery/gal\\_video.htm#](http://www.jsf.mil/gallery/gal_video.htm#)

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# SED F-35 Independent Software Safety Analysis Task (ISSAT)

- The F-35 Mission Systems Prime Software IPT requested the Software Engineering Directorate (SED) to perform Independent Software Safety Analysis of the Safety Evidence Assurance Level 1 (SEAL-1) F-35 Mission Systems Prime Software



**SED SASL was selected by F-35 JPO for their experience,  
training, and documented processes**

## TASK:

- SED SASL performed software safety analyses to identify software system safety critical anomalies within the software requirements, design, code, and/or interfaces on the Mission Systems Prime SEAL 1 Software comprised of four domains:
  - Pilot Systems Software (PSSW)
  - Fire Control Navigation and Stores (FCN&S)
  - Mission/Data Collection (MSN/DC)
  - Core Processing Software (CPSW)



Sources: [http://www.jsf.mil/images/gallery/sdd/f35\\_test/a/sdd\\_f35testa\\_070.jpg](http://www.jsf.mil/images/gallery/sdd/f35_test/a/sdd_f35testa_070.jpg)  
[http://www.jsf.mil/images/gallery/sdd/f35\\_test/a/sdd\\_f35testa\\_147.jpg](http://www.jsf.mil/images/gallery/sdd/f35_test/a/sdd_f35testa_147.jpg)


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- **Fundamental Element - SED Software System Safety Analysis Process (S<sup>4</sup>AP)**
  - **Satisfied Objectives:**
    1. Disciplined approach
    2. Hazard-based software safety analyses
    3. Customer desire for active role/insight to analysis process and results
- **Software Safety Analysis – Design & implementation of a database for use in recording all analyses**
  - **Satisfied Objectives:**
    4. Repeatable analysis processes
    5. Analyst consistency
    6. Auditable results
    7. Automated metrics reporting
    8. Automated report generation
    9. Consistent status reporting

- 1. Disciplined approach – SED has been applying & evolving the S<sup>4</sup>AP since 2003 with great success**
  - 2. Hazard-based software safety analyses – SED analyses focus on analysis of software within the context of software contribution & mitigation of system hazards**
  - 3. Customer desire for active role/insight to analysis process and results – SED produces an Independent Software Safety Assessment Report (ISSAR) to supplement/complement the Safety Assessment Report (SAR)**
- SED SASL analysis focused on providing SW safety evaluation of:**
    - Hazard records from the Hazard database**
    - SW requirements**
    - SW architecture and detailed design including models**
    - Interface messages**
    - Source Code**

- **Design & implementation of a MS Access database for use in recording all analyses performed**
- **Objectives this would satisfy:**
  - 4. Repeatable analysis processes – rules were established as to how analyses would be recorded in various database elements**
  - 5. Analyst consistency – checklists were established in the database to be applied to specific analyses**
  - 6. Auditable results – analyst results were recorded in the database to include items such as specific code filenames & code lines evaluated**
  - 7. Automated metrics reporting – the database design facilitated specific metrics such as classification/counts of recorded results**
  - 8. Automated report generation – various reports were designed to export key information using fields from the database**
  - 9. Consistent status reporting - the database was developed to provide “item” counts to be analyzed & % complete**

# SED Software Safety Analysis Database Schema Overview







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# SED SASL Criticality Analysis Report (Screenshot)



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## SED SASL Criticality Analysis Report (CAR)

MS Domain:

Scope:

Release Received:

Safety Critical Function:

SRS Reqt. ID:

Parent Reqt. (DOORS ID):

Req. Text:

Failure Condition

Failure Effect

Applicable LM Hazard Num. & Severity:

Failure Effect Severity Level:

Rationale:



# SED SASL Findings Report (Screenshot)



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## SED SASL Findings Report

MSR #

MS Domain:

Scope:

Release Received:

Finding Number

Status:

Severity Level:

Finding Title:

Finding Description:

Root Cause:

Applicable LM Hazard Num. & Severity:

Applicable LM Hazard Num. Rationale:

Safety Violation Source(s):

SED Reqs. Checklist Violation(s):

SED Design Checklist Violation(s):

SED Code Checklist Violation(s):

SW Dev. Phase

Source

Mechanism

Outcome

Impact

Recommended Solution:

- All software safety analyses were presented within the context of the hazard it controlled or contributed to
- High quality reports were easily produced with sufficient detail to be understandable
- Quantifiable status reporting was easily produced
  - Customer appreciated having metrics as true indication of work performed & remaining
- Customer expressed recognition of the consistent, disciplined rigor being applied throughout the ISSAT
- Customer was impressed with the SASL personnel depth of analysis & understanding of the software achieved in a short time

**SED SASL successfully applied their processes to perform in-depth software safety analysis**



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