

# Mathematical Techniques to Improve the Utility of a Hazard Risk Matrix

**Don Swallom** 


U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command Redstone Arsenal, Alabama August 2018

#### **Caveat**

Opinions expressed are those of the author and not the coordinated position of AMCOM, Army Materiel Command, the US Army or the Department of Defense.

But they should


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#### **Topics for this Tutorial**

- Purpose of a Hazard Risk Matrix
- Understanding the Attributes of a welldesigned risk assessment matrix
- How to Assign a Risk Assessment Code
- Understanding Probability
- Building an Expanded Matrix
- Plotting Accidents on a Matrix
- Using Relative Risk Values
- Building Hazard Risk Profiles

#### **Source of the DOD Hazard Risk Matrix**



#### Purpose of a Hazard Risk Matrix

 Determine who accepts the risk of a particular hazard

"...The Program Manager will use the methodology in MIL-STD-882E...Prior to exposing people, equipment, or the environment to known systemrelated ESOH hazards, the Program Manager will document that the associated risks have been accepted by the following acceptance authorities: the CAE for high risks, Program Executive Officerlevel for serious risks, and the Program Manager for medium and low risks..." - Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02, January 7, 2015.

#### Purpose of a Hazard Risk Matrix

- Inform the risk acceptor of the nature of the risk.
- "It's a 1D, Serious" does not really do that.

"The standard for risk management is leadership at the appropriate level of authority making <u>informed</u> decisions to control hazards or accept risks."


Army Regulation 385-10
The Army Safety Program
29 February 2000

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			Severity s	scale cov	ers full r	ange of p	ossible d	outcome	s
	2	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
}	Severity	≥\$2k	≥\$20k	≥\$200k	≥\$2M	≥\$20M	≥\$200M	≥\$2B	≥\$20B
Fı	requency	Injury, no lost work day	Lost Work Day	Permanent partial disability	≥1 Fatality	≥10 Fatalities	≥100 Fatalities	≥1,000 Fatalities	≥10,000 Fatalities
Α	>100								
В	>10								
С	>1						Proh	ibitive SEC	DEF
D	>0.1					High	- CAE		
Е	>0.01				Serio	us - PEO			
F	>0.001			Mediur	m - PM	Pro	posed		
G	>0.0001	Low - SSW	/G/Principal	for Safety			OD		
Н	>0.00001					N	latrix		
I	> 0.000001								
J	≤ 0.000001								







**Severity 7** 

**Severity 4** 

#### **Politics**

### Navy Seeks \$30 Million to Fix Gear That Hobbled Its New Carrier

By Anthony Capaccio
July 25, 2018, 10:04 AM CDT

- Congress asked to shift funds to repair Ford aircraft carrier
- Huntington Ingalls continues talks with General Electric



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


🔀 Email

The Navy is asking Congress to shift \$30 million from other accounts to start repairing a damaged gear on the service's costliest warship, the Gerald R. Ford aircraft carrier.

The request for funds to repair the \$13 billion carrier is part of a Pentagon package asking congressional approval to shift \$4.7 billion in previously approved Army, Air Force and Navy funding into new programs or higher-priority projects. The package must be approved by all four congressional defense committees, where it's pending.

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8			
2	Severity	≥\$2k	≥\$20k	≥\$200k	≥\$2M	≥\$20M	≥\$200M	≥\$2B	≥\$20B			
F	requency	Probability calibrated with reference to an exposure interval (accidents per 1,000 troops per year,										
Α	>100		•	•	•	•	•	•	00			
В	>10		accidents per 100,000 FH, accidents per 1,000,000 missile firings, etc.)									
С	>1						Proh	ibitive SEC	DEF			
D	>0.1					High	- CAE					
Ε	>0.01				Serio	us - PEO						
F	>0.001			Mediur	n - PM							
G	>0.0001	Low - SSW	/G/Principa	for Safety								
Н	>0.00001											
	> 0.000001											
J	≤ 0.000001											



y = f(x) probability = f(severity)

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
,	Severity	≥\$2k	≥\$20k	≥\$200k	≥\$2M	≥\$20M	≥\$200M	≥\$2B	≥\$20B
F	requency	Injury, no lost work day	Lost Work Day	Permanent partial disability	≥1 Fatality	≥10 Fatalities	≥100 Fatalities	≥1,000 Fatalities	≥10,000 Fatalities
Α	>100								
В	>10								
С	>1						Proh	ibitive SEC	DEF
D	>0.1					High	- CAE		
Е	>0.01				Serio	us - PEO			
F	>0.001			Mediur	m - PM				
G	>0.0001	Low - SSV	/G/Principa	   for Safety					
Н	>0.00001	(4)							
	> 0.000001	Ca	artesiar	Orient	ation -	Increa	se up a	nd to t	he right
J	≤ 0.000001								V

y
 y = f(x) probability = f(severity)

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
,	Severity	≥\$2k	≥\$20k	≥\$200k	≥\$2M	≥\$20M	≥\$200M	≥\$2B	≥\$20B
F	requency	Injury, no lost work day	Lost Work Day	Permanent partial disability	≥1 Fatality	≥10 Fatalities	≥100 Fatalities	≥1,000 Fatalities	≥10,000 Fatalities
Α	>100								
В	>10								
С	>1						Proh	ibitive SEC	DEF
D	>0.1	<b></b>	····			High	- CAE		
Ε	>0.01				Serio	us - PEO			
F	>0.001 H	low doe	es one	assign	the Ris	k Asse	ssment	Code	(RAC)?
G	>0.0001	Low – SSW	/G/Principa	for Safety	· Vina	·			
Н	>0.00001					The same	· • • • •		
	> 0.00001						11.00	****	
J	≤ 0.000001								

	2	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	Severity	≥\$2k	≥\$20k	≥\$200k	≥\$2M	≥\$20M	≥\$200M	≥\$2B	≥\$20B
Fı	requency	Injury, no lost work day	Lost Work Day	Permanent partial disability	≥1 Fatality	≥10 Fatalities	I		≥10,000 Fatalities
Α	>100								
В	>10								
С	>1						Proh	ibitive SEC	DEF
D	>0.1					High	- CAE		
Ε	>0.01				Serio	us - PEO			
F	>0.001	5		Mediur	n - PM				
G	>0.0001		levels a	assigne	d to ce	lls con	sistent		
Н	>0.00001		_	rs of eq	ual risl	k (iso-r	isk		
	> 0.000001	conto	ours)						
J	≤ 0.000001								

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
3	Severity	≥\$2k	≥\$20k	≥\$200k	≥\$2M	≥\$20M	≥\$200M	≥\$2B	≥\$20B
Fr	equency	Injury, no lost work day	Lost Work Day	Permanent partial disability	≥1 Fatality	≥10 Fatalities	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,		≥10,000 Fatalities
Α	>100								
В	>10								
С	>1						Proh	ibitive SEC	DEF
D	>0.1					High	- CAE		
	>0.01				Serio	us - PEO			
4			:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::	f.o.o.u.o.	- DM			.l. o o 4	
G	Sufficient severity le	-		_	_	_	_	1	
Н	the probal								
	> 0.000001								
J	≤ 0.000001							N	ledium - PM

	requency Category Letters	ent code for hazards whose risk has been ggest: 0R "Zero R" as in Zero Risk in lieu of F.										
	Increase	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8			
	with	≥\$2k	≥\$20k	≥\$200k	≥\$2M	≥\$20M	≥\$200M	≥\$2B	≥\$20B			
	ecreasing requency	Injury, no lost work day	Lost Work Day	Permanent partial disability	≥1 Fatality	≥10 Fatalities	≥100 Fatalities	≥1,000 Fatalities	≥10,000 Fatalities			
Α	>100											
В	>10											
С	>1						Proh	ibitive SEC	DEF			
D	>0.1					High	- CAE					
Е	>0.01				Serio	us - PEO						
F	>0.001			Mediur	n - PM							
G	>0.0001	Low - SSW	/G/Principal	for Safety								
Н	>0.00001											
I	> 0.000001											
J	<b>₹</b> 0.000001											

	Frequency Category Letters	ent code for hazards whose risk has been ggest: 0R "Zero R" as in Zero Risk in lieu of F.										
	Increase	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8			
11.	with	≥\$2k	≥\$20k	≥\$200k	≥\$2M	≥\$20M	≥\$200M	≥\$2B	≥\$20B			
	Decreasing Frequency	Injury, no lost work day	Lost Work Day	Permanent partial disability	≥1 Fatality	≥10 Fatalities	≥100 Fatalities	≥1,000 Fatalities	≥10,000 Fatalities			
Α	>100											
В	>10											
C	>1						Proh	ibitive SEC	DEF			
D	>0.1					High	- CAE					
Ε	>0.01				Serio	us - PEO						
F	F MIL-STD-882E Eliminated											

#### 8

#### Attributes of a well-designed risk assessment matrix

A risk assessment code for hazards whose risk has been eliminated. Suggest: 0R "Zero R" as in Zero Risk in lieu of F.

	2 4	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	Severity	≥\$2k	≥\$20k	≥\$200k	≥\$2M	≥\$20M	≥\$200M	≥\$2B	≥\$20B
Fı	requency	Injury, no lost work day	Lost Work Day	Permanent partial disability	≥1 Fatality	≥10 Fatalities	≥100 Fatalities	≥1,000 Fatalities	≥10,000 Fatalities
Α	>100								
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G	>0.0001	Low - SSW	/G/Principal	for Safety					
Н	>0.00001								
I	> 0.000001								
J	≤ 0.000001								

_	• •	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
5	Severity	≥\$2k	≥\$20k	≥\$200k	≥\$2M	≥\$20M	≥\$200M	≥\$2B	≥\$20B
Fr	equency	Injury, no lost work day	Lost Work Day	Permanent partial disability	≥1 Fatality	≥10 Fatalities			≥10,000 Fatalities
Α	>100								
В	>10								
С	>1						Prohibitive SECDEF		DEF
D	>0.1					High	- CAE		
Ε	>0.01				Serio	5E			
F	>0.001			Mediur	n - PM				
G	>0.0001	Low - SSW	/G/Principal	for Safety					
3)	>0.00001								


systems within the family of systems.

≥ U.UUUUU I


Severity Category numbers increase with increasing Severity

5	Severity	1	2	3	4	5	6
	20 1 01 11y	≥\$2k	≥\$20k	≥\$200k	≥\$2M	≥\$20M	
Fr	equency	Injury, no lost work day	Lost Work Day	Permanent partial disability	≥1 Fatality	≥10 Fatalities	
Α	>100				Prohibitiv	e SECDEF	
В	>10						
С	>1						
D	>0.1					High	- CAE
E	>0.01				Serio	5E	
F	>0.001			Mediur	n - PM		
G	>0.0001	Low - SSW	/G/Principal	for Safety			

#### **Mother of All Risk Assessment Matrices (Spaceship Earth)**




## Even the Mother of All Risk Assessment Matrices can be tailored to the area most useful for the user.




#### **Additional Recommendation**


 Eliminate one-word labels for Severity (Catastrophic, Critical, Marginal, Negligible) and Probability (Frequent, Probable, Occasional, Remote, Improbable)





#### **Additional Recommendation**


Just use Severity 1, Severity 2, Probability C, etc.



















**PEO** Severity **Aviation** \$100K \$10K \$1M \$10M **Probability 1A 2A 3A** 4A **HIGH HIGH SERIOUS MEDIUM AAE AAE PEO PM** 100 **1B 2B** 3B **4B** B **HIGH HIGH SERIOUS MEDIUM AAE** AAE **PEO** PM 10 **1C** 2C **3C** 4C **SERIOUS SERIOUS MEDIUM** HIGH **AAE PEO PEO PM** 1D 2D 3D 4D **MEDIUM SERIOUS SERIOUS MEDIUM PEO PEO** PM **PM** 0.1 1E 2E 3E 4E **MEDIUM SERIOUS MEDIUM LOW PEO** PM PM PM 0.01 1F 2F 3F 4F **MEDIUM** LOW LOW **LOW** PM **PM** PM PM 0




#### **Topics for this Tutorial**


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(1) Identify the full range of potential outcomes for the hazard (death, injury, system loss, environmental impact, and monetary loss). The range of outcomes will often span more than one severity category.


	В	HIGH AAE	HIGH AAE	SERIOUS PEO	MEDIUM PM
10	<b>C</b>	1C HIGH AAE	2C SERIOUS PEO	3C SERIOUS PEO	4C MEDIUM PM
0.1	D 0.1	1D SERIOUS PEO	2D SERIOUS PEO	3D MEDIUM PM	4D MEDIUM PM
	E	1E SERIOUS PEO	2E MEDIUM PM	3E MEDIUM PM	4E LOW PM
<b>OR</b> 0.01	F 0.01	1F MEDIUM PM	2F LOW PM	3F LOW PM	4F LOW PM
U	ت ا				







(3) Determine which severity-probability pair has the greatest risk. This pair is the RAC assigned to the hazard

0K








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#### **Probability:**


"A number expressing the likelihood that a specific event will occur, expressed as the ratio of the number of actual occurrences to the number of possible occurrences."

- The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition



#### **Math Definition:**

- Repeat a random experiment "n" number of times.
- If a specific outcome has occurred "f" times in these n trials, the number "f" is the frequency of the outcome.
- The ratio f/n is the relative frequency of the outcome.
- A relative frequency is usually very unstable for small values of "n," but it tends to stabilize about some number "p" as "n" increases.
- The number "p" is the probability of the outcome.



#### Simple example:

Probability of rolling a "3" with one die.

Roll #1 - "5", 
$$f/n = 0/1 = 0$$

Roll #2 - "2", 
$$f/n = 0/2 = 0$$

Roll #3 - "3", 
$$f/n = 1/3 = .333...$$

Roll #4 - "4", 
$$f/n = 1/4 = .25$$


Roll #1,000: 163 "3"s, f/n = 163/1000 = .163

Rolls approach infinity f/n = .166666....



#### **Rolling Dice**

Roll a single die 30 times. The expected value of each roll is 3.5. What you actually get is somewhat different.



Hazard: Helicopter strikes wire; results in Class A mishap Probability: 4.406E-06 occurrences per flight hour

1 Flight Hr, no mishap, rate = 0


1,000 Flight Hrs, no mishap, rate = 0

176,182 Flight Hrs, 1st mishap, rate = 5.676E-06 /flt hr 274,539 Flight Hrs, 2nd mishap, rate = 7.285E-06 /flt hr 700,462 Flt Hrs, 3rd mishap, rate = 4.283E-06 /flt hr 10,000,000 Flt Hrs, 46 mishaps, rate = 4.600E-06 /flt hr 1,000,000,000 Hrs, 4407 mishaps, rate = 4.407E-06 /flt hr Flight hours approach infinity, rate = 4.406E-06 /flt hr

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PEO Aviation Risk Decision Authority Matrix



# Applying Probability Classifications to a military helicopter

Fleet Size = 368 aircraft

Utilization = 240 hours/year

Life = 12 years/aircraft

Aircraft Life =  $240 \times 12$ = 2,880 hours

Fleet Exposure Hours =  $368 \times 240 \times 12$ = 1,059,840 hours

Fleet Hours per Year = 368 x 240 = 88,320 hours

	Events		Events		
	per	Flight	per	Events	Years
	Flight	Hours per	100,000	per	per
	Hour	Event	Flt Hrs	Year	Event
Frequent <b>A</b>	9				
	10 <sup>-3</sup>	1,000	100	88.32	0.0113
Probable <b>B</b>	10 <sup>-4</sup>	10,000	10	8.832	0.113
Occasional <b>C</b>		·			
	10 <sup>-5</sup>	100,000	1	0.8832	1.13
Remote <b>D</b>	10 <sup>-6</sup>	1,000,000	0.1	0.0883	11.3
Improbable <b>E</b>	-	1,000,000			
	10 <sup>-7</sup>	10,000,000	0.01	0.00883	113
Very Improbable	0		0	0	
Zero Risk <b>0R</b>			b	U	


	Events per Flight	Flight Hours per	Events per 100,000	Events per	Years per	
88,320 flt			10 Ev		_	<b>8.832 Events</b>
Year		<b>^</b> 10	0,000	flt h	rs -	Year
Probable D	10 <sup>-4</sup>	10,000	10	8.832	0.113	
Occasional <b>C</b>	10 <sup>-5</sup>	100,000	1	0.8832	1.13	
Remote D		,	-			
Improbable <b>E</b>	10 <sup>-6</sup>	1,000,000	0.1	0.0883	11.3	
	10 <sup>-7</sup>	10,000,000	0.01	0.00883	113	
Very Improbable	0		0	0		
Zero Risk <b>0R</b>						

	Events		Events			Event	
	per	Flight	per	Events	Years	per	Fleet Life
	Flight	Hours per	100,000	per	per	Fleet	per
	Hour	Event	Flt Hrs	Year	Event	Life	Event
Frequent <b>A</b>	3	4 000	400	00.00	0.0440	4 000	0.000044
D	10 <sup>-3</sup>	1,000	100	88.32	0.0113	1,060	0.000944
Probable <b>B</b>	10 <sup>-4</sup>	10,000	10	8.832	0.113	105.98	0.00944
Occasional C	10 <sup>-5</sup>	100,000	1	0.8832	1.13	10.598	0.0944
Remote <b>D</b>	10 <sup>-6</sup>	1,000,000	0.1	0.0883	11.3	1.0598	0.944
Improbable <b>E</b>	10 <sup>-7</sup>	10,000,000	0.01	0.00883	113	0.106	9.44
Very Improbable <b>F</b>		10,000,000			110		J.77
Zero Risk <b>0R</b>	0		0	0		0	

	Events per Flight	Flight Hours per	Events per 100,000	Events per	Years per	Event per Fleet	Fleet Life per	
1,059,840 <del>1</del>	It hr	<u>s</u> ,	<u> 10 Ev</u>	<u>rents</u>	_	<u>105.</u>	98 Ev	<u>ents</u>
1 fleet l	ife	<b>^</b> 10	0,000	flt h	<del>rs</del> -	1 F	leet L	_ife
Probable D	10 <sup>-4</sup>	10,000	10	8.832	0.113	105.98	0.00944	
Occasional <b>C</b>	10 <sup>-5</sup>	100,000	1	0.8832	1.13	10.598	0.0944	
Remote <b>D</b>	-	,						
Improbable <b>E</b>	10 <sup>-6</sup>	1,000,000	0.1	0.0883	11.3	1.0598	0.944	
_	10 <sup>-7</sup>	10,000,000	0.01	0.00883	113	0.106	9.44	
Very Improbable	0		0	0		0		
Zero Risk <b>0R</b>								

	Events		Events			Event	
	per	Flight	per	<b>Events</b>	Years	per	Fleet Life
	Flight	Hours per	100,000	per	per	Fleet	per
	Hour	Event	Flt Hrs	Year	Event	Life	Event
Frequent <b>A</b>							
	10 <sup>-3</sup>	1,000	100	88.32	0.0113	1,060	0.000944
Probable <b>B</b>	10 <sup>-4</sup>	10,000	10	8.832	0.113	105.98	0.00944
Occasional C	10	10,000					
	10 <sup>-5</sup>	100,000	1	0.8832	1.13	10.598	0.0944
Remote <b>D</b>	10 <sup>-6</sup>	1,000,000	0.1	0.0883	11.3	1.0598	0.944
Immunahahla <b>F</b>	10	1,000,000	0.1	0.0000		110000	0.044
Improbable <b>L</b>	10 <sup>-7</sup>	10,000,000	0.01	0.00883	113	0.106	9.44
Very Improbable			•			•	
Zero Risk <b>0R</b>	0		0	0		0	

Numbers greater than 1 are easier to comprehend



#### **Consequences of Risk Acceptance**

**Consequences of Risk Acceptance:** 

On the order of 2 to 10 Class A accidents due to this hazard over the remaining life cycle of the aircraft.

								1			
				Aircraft Exp	osure Hours.	2,880	hours				
				Fleet Exp	Fleet Exposure Hours: 1059,840 hours			Fleet-wide			
	Events		Events	Fleet Ho	urs per Year:	88,320	hours			Event	
	per	Flight	per					<b>Events</b>	Years	per	Fleet Life
	Flight	Hours per	100,000	1	2	_ 3 _	4	per	per	Fleet	per
	Hour	Event	Flt Hrs	\$10			ook -	Year	Event	Life	Event
Α				1A -	2A	3A	4A				
	10 <sup>-3</sup>	1,000	100	Hig	gh			88.32	0.0113	1, <mark>(</mark> 60	0.000944
В	4.0-4	40.000	10	1B	<b>2B</b>	3B	4B	0 000	0.442	10.00	0.00944
C	10 <sup>-4</sup>	10,000	10	1C	2C Ser	ious 3C	4C	8.832	0.113	105.98	0.00944
	10 <sup>-5</sup>	100,000	1		ZO PI	50 30	70	0.8832	1.13	10.598	0.0944
D	.0		-	(1D)-	2D	3D	40	0.000		2 - 10	
	10 <sup>-6</sup>	1,000,000	0.1			30	40	0.0883	11.3	1.0598	0.944
E		,,		1E	2E Med	3E	4E				
	10 <sup>-7</sup>	10,000,000	0.01				•	0.00883	113	0.106	9.44
F		, ,		1F	<b>2F</b>	3F	4F				
<b>OD</b>	0		0					0		0	
0R											

#### **Consequences of Risk Acceptance**

Consequences of Risk Acceptance:
On the order of 2 to 10 Class A accidents due to this hazard over the remaining life cycle of the aircraft.


Event per Fleet Life

#### **Topics for this Tutorial**

- Purpose of a Hazard Risk Matrix
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#### Mishap Risk & Mishap Loss

#### Mishap Risk over Time results in Mishap Loss



#### **Mishap History**

Based on this relationship between mishap risk and mishap loss, we can plot mishap histories on a risk matrix as follows:


$$= \frac{\$361,671,038}{59} = \$6,130,018$$


$$=\frac{59}{1,588,597}$$
 = 3.714 mishaps / 100,000 Flt Hrs

# **Mishap History**


<u>Class</u>	<u>No</u>	Total Cost	Cost/Mishap	Mishaps per 100,000 Flt Hrs
Α	59	\$361,671,038	\$6,130,018	3.714
В	39	\$18,854,121	\$483,439	2.455
C	245	\$17,114,206	\$69,854	15.422
D	112	\$970,148	\$8,662	7.050
Total	455	\$398,609,513		

#### **Mishaps**








## **Mishaps**





## **Mishaps**











#### **Topics for this Tutorial**

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# Matrix Relative Risk Values (Risk Units)(Clemens)

	Α	В	С	D	E	F
1						
2						100
3						10 10
4				100 <del>←</del>	10 ← 10 X	1 10 Risk Unit (Clemens)

# Matrix Relative Risk Values (Clemens)

	Α	В	С	D	E	F
1	100,000,000	10,000,000	1,000,000	100,000	10,000	1,000
2	10,000,000	1,000,000	100,000	10,000	1,000	100
3	1,000,000	100,000	10,000	1,000	100	10
4	100,000	10,000	1,000	100	10	1

# **Helo A Hazard Distribution**

	Α	В	С	D	Е	F
1				5	14	65
2				4	6	2
3			1	7	5	4
4				2	1	


# Helo A Matrix Relative Values (Clemens)

	Α	В	С	D	E	F
1				5 x 100,000 = 500,000	14 x 10,000 = 140,000	65 x 1,000 = 65,000
2				4 x 10,000 = 40,000	6 x 1,000 = 6,000	2 x 100 = 200
3			1 x 10,000 = 10,000	7 x 1,000 = 7,000	5 x 100 = 500	4 x 10 = 40
4				2 x 100 = 200	1 x 10 = 10	


# Helo A Matrix Relative Values (Clemens)

	Α	В	С	D	Ш	F
1				500,000	140,000	65,000
2				40,000	6,000	200
3			10,000	7,000	500	40
4				200	10	


# **Helicopter A**




# **Helicopter B**





# **Helicopter C**





# Side by Side Relative Risk by RAC


















# **Topics for this Tutorial**

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
	Α	В	С	D	E	F
1				5	14	65
2				4	6	2
3			1	7	5	4
4				2	1	

		3.16E-04	3.16E-05	3.16	E-06	3.16E-07	3.16E-08
	Α	В	С	, Č		E	F
1						14	65
2						6	2
3			1			5	4
4						1	


		3.16E-04	3.16E-05	3.16E-06	3.16E-07	3.16E-08
	Α	В	C	D	E	F
1	2.23E-05	Sum		5 x 3.16E-06 = 1.58E-05	14 x 3.16E-07 = 4.43E-06	65 x 3.16E-08 = 2.06E-06
2	1.46E-05	Sum		4 x 3.16E-06 = 1.26E-05	6 x 3.16E-07 = 1.90E-06	2 x 3.16E-08 = 6.32E-08
3	5.55E-05	€ Sum	1 x 3.16E-05 = 3.16E-05	7 x 3.16E-06 = 2.21E-05	5 x 3.16E-07 = 1.58E-06	4 x 3.16E-08 = 1.26E-07
4	6.64E-06	Sum		2 x 3.16E-06 = 6.32E-06	1 x 3.16E-07 = 3.16E-07	




#### **Comparing Hazard Profile to Accident History**




#### **Comparing Hazard Profile to Accident History**



#### **Comparing Hazard Profile to Accident History**



#### **US Army Aviation Mishaps**



# **Missile Risk Matrix**

	RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX					
SEVERITY *	Catastrophic	Critical OM (2) \$1	Marginal (3) \$10	Negligible (4)		
Frequent (A)	High	High	Serious	Medium		
Probable (B) 10 <sup>-2</sup>	High	High	Serious	Medium		
Occasional (C) 10 <sup>-3</sup>	High	Serious	Medium	Low		
Remote (D) 10 <sup>-6</sup>	Serious	Medium	Medium	Low		
Improbable (E)	Medium	Medium	Medium	Low		
Eliminated (F)	l Filminated					

### **Missile Hazard Risk Matrix**

	RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX					
SEVERITY *	Catastrophic	OM (2) \$1	Marginal (3) \$10	Negligible (4)		
Frequent (A)	High	High	Serious	Medium		
Probable (B)	High	High	Serious	Medium		
0ccasional (C)	High	Serious	Medium	Low		
1/1,000 Remote (D)	Serious	Medium	Medium	Low		
1/1,000,000   Improbable (E)	Medium	Medium	Medium	Low		
Eliminated (F)						

# **Back of the Envelope Calculation**

40,000 Shishkebab Missiles

Delivered over 20 years

Assume all fired

1 accident in 1,000,000 firings


$$\frac{1 \text{ accident}}{1,000,000 \text{ firings}} \times \frac{40,000 \text{ firings}}{20 \text{ years}} = \frac{1 \text{ accident}}{500 \text{ years}}$$


### **Missile Hazard Risk Matrix**


	RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX							
SEVERITY PROBABILITY *	Catastrophic	1 Fatal \$10M	Critical (2)	<b>\$1</b>	M	Marginal (3)	\$100	Negligible (4)
Frequent (A)	High 1 in < 2 days		High			Serious		Medium
Probable (B)	High		High			Serious		Medium
Occasional (C)	1 in 18.5 days High		Serious			Medium		Low
Remote (D)	1 in 6 months  Serious		Medium			Medium		Low
Improbable (E)	1 in 500 years  Medium		Medium			Medium		Low
Eliminated (F)	Eliminated							


	1	2	3	4	
Α	1,000,000,000	100,000,000	10,000,000	1,000,000	
В	10 <sup>-1</sup> 100,000,000	10,000,000	1,000,000	100,000	
С	10,000,000	1,000,000	100,000	10,000	
	10 <sup>-3</sup> 1,000,000	100,000	10,000	1,000	
D	100,000	10,000	1,000	100	
	10,000 10 <sup>-6</sup>	1,000	100	10	
E	1,000	100	10	1	


	1	1 2		4	
A	1,000,000,000 10 <sup>-1</sup>	100,000,000	10,000,000	1,000,000	
В	100,000,000	10,000,000	1,000,000	100,000	
С	10,000,000 10 <sup>-3</sup>	1,000,000	100,000	10,000	
D	1,110,000	111,000	11,100	1,110	
E	1,000	100	10	1	





















	1	2	3	4
A	1,000,000,000	100,000,000	10,000,000	1,000,000
В	100,000,000	10,000,000	1,000,000	100,000
С	10,000,000	1,000,000	100,000	10,000
D	1,110,000	111,000	11,100	1,110
E	1,000	100	10	1



	1	2	3	4
A	10,000,000	0,000,000 1,000,000		10,000
В	1,000,000	100,000	10,000	1,000
С	100,000 10,000		1,000	100
D	10,000	1,000	100	10
E	1,000	100	10	1

	1	2	3	4
A	10,000,000	1,000,000	100,000	10,000
В	1 in 6 months 1,000,000	100,000	10,000	1,000
С	1 in 5 years 100,000	10,000	1,000	100
D	1 in 50 years  10,000	1,000	100	10
E	1 in 500 years 1,000	100	10	1

	1	2	3	4	
A	10,000	100,000	1,000,000	10,000,000	
В	1 in 6 months 1,000	10,000	100,000	1,000,000	
С	1 in 5 years 100	1,000	10,000	100,000	
D	1 in 50 years  10	100	1,000	10,000	
E	1 in 500 years  1	10	100	1,000	

## Summary

# Summary Attributes of a well-designed risk assessment matrix

- Severity scale covers full range of possible outcomes
- Probability calibrated with reference to an exposure interval
- Equally proportioned, logarithmic scales (1, 10, 100, 1000...)
- ✓ Cartesian Orientation Increase up and to the right
- ✓ Risk levels assigned to cells consistent with contours of equal risk

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
,	Severity	≥\$2k	≥\$20k	≥\$200k	≥\$2M	≥\$20M	≥\$200M	≥\$2B	≥\$20B
Fı	requency	Injury, no lost work day	Lost Work Day	Permanent partial disability	≥1 Fatality	≥10 Fatalities	≥100 Fatalities	≥1,000 Fatalities	≥10,000 Fatalities
Α	>100								
В	>10								
С	>1						Proh	ibitive SEC	DEF
D	>0.1					High	- CAE		
Е	>0.01				Serio	us - PEO			
F	>0.001			Mediur	n - PM				
G	>0.0001	Low - SSW	/G/Principal	for Safety					
Н	>0.00001								
ı	> 0.000001								
J	≤ 0.000001								

# Summary Attributes of a well-designed risk assessment matrix

- Sufficient probability categories so highest severity level reach the PM level
- ✓ Frequency category letters increase with decreasing frequency
- A RAC for hazards whose risk has been eliminated
- Easily tailored & consistent with other systems within its family of systems
- Severity Category numbers increase with increasing Severity

	Carranitur		2	3	4	5	6	7	8
•	Severity	≥\$2k	≥\$20k	≥\$200k	≥\$2M	≥\$20M	≥\$200M	≥\$2B	≥\$20B
Fr	equency	Injury, no lost work day	Lost Work Day	Permanent partial disability	≥1 Fatality	≥10 Fatalities	≥100 Fatalities	≥1,000 Fatalities	≥10,000 Fatalities
Α	>100								
В	>10								
С	>1						Proh	ibitive SEC	DEF
D	>0.1					High	- CAE		
Е	>0.01				Serio	us - PEO			
F	>0.001			Mediur	n - PM				
G	>0.0001	Low - SSW	/G/Principal	for Safety					
Н	>0.00001								
I	> 0.000001								
J	≤ 0.000001								

#### How to Determine the Risk Assessment Code (RAC)

To determine the appropriate RAC for a given hazard:

- (1) Identify the full range of potential outcomes for the hazard (death, injury, system loss, environmental impact, and monetary loss). The range of outcomes will often span more than one severity category.
- (2) For each severity category associated with this range of severity, determine the associated probability category.
- (3) Determine which severity-probability pair has the greatest risk. This pair is the RAC assigned to the hazard.
- (4) If two or more severity-probability pairs are equal as the greatest risk, select the one with the greatest severity.

## **Summary** Understanding Probability

#### **Math Definition:**



- Repeat a random experiment "n" number of times.
- If a specific outcome has occurred "f" times in these n trials, the number "f" is the frequency of the outcome.
- The ratio f/n is the relative frequency of the outcome.
- A relative frequency is usually very unstable for small values of "n," but it tends to stabilize about some number "p" as "n" increases.
- The number "p" is the probability of the outcome.

$$p = f / n$$

for very large values of n


#### Simple example:

Probability of rolling a "3" with one die.

Roll #1 - "5", 
$$f/n = 0$$

Roll #2 - "2", 
$$f/n = 0$$








Rolls approach infinity f/n = .166666...

Roll a single die 30 times. The expected value of each roll is 3.5. What you actually get is somewhat different.



Hazard: AH-64 strikes wire results in Class A mishap Probability: 4.406E-06 occurrences per flight hour

1 Flight Hr, no mishap, rate = 0

1,000 Flight Hrs, no mishap, rate = 0

176,182 Flight Hrs, 1 mishap, rate = 5.676E-06 /flt hr

274,539 Flight Hrs, 2 mishaps, rate = 7.285E-06 /flt hr

700,462 Flt Hrs, 3 mishaps, rate = 4.283E-06 /flt hr

10,000,000 Flt Hrs, 46 mishaps, rate = 4.600E-06 /flt hr

1,000,000,000 Hrs, 4407 mishaps, rate = 4.407E-06 /flt hr

Flight hours approach infinity, rate = 4.406E-06 /flt hr

117,

12

### **Summary** Expanded Matrix

#### Applying Probability Classifications to a military helicopter

Fleet Size = 368 aircraft

Utilization = 240 hours/year

Life = 20 years/aircraft

Aircraft Life =  $240 \times 20$ 

= 4,800 hours

Fleet Exposure Hours =  $368 \times 240 \times 20$ 

= 1,776,400 hours

Fleet Hours per Year =  $368 \times 240$ 

= 88,320 hours

#### **US Army PEO Aviation Expanded Matrix**

	Events		Events			Event	
	per	Flight	per	Events	Years	per	Fleet Life
	Flight	Hours per	100,000	per	per	Fleet	per
	Hour	Event	Flt Hrs	Year	Event	Life	Event
Frequent <b>A</b>	10 <sup>-3</sup>	1,000	100	88.32	0.0113	1,060	0.000944
Probable B		10,000	10	8.832	0.113	105.98	0.00944
Occasional C	10 <sup>-5</sup>	100,000	1	0.8832	1.13	10.598	0.0944
Remote D	10 <sup>-6</sup>	1,000,000	0.1	0.0883	11.3	1.0598	0.944
Improbable <b></b>	10 <sup>-7</sup>	10,000,000	0.01	0.00883	113	0.106	9.44
Very Improbable F Zero Risk <b>0</b> R	0		0	٥		0	
Zelo Risk OT V							

Numbers greater than 1 are easier to comprehend


				10							
				16	Assum	ptions		1			
Input					Fleet Size:	368	aircraft				
	اء ما				Utilization:	240.0	hours/yr				
Calculat	ea				Aircraft Life:	12	years				
					Calcul	ations					
				Aircraft Expo	sure Hours:	2,880	hours				
				Fleet Expo	sure Hours:	1,059,840	hours		Flee	t-wide	
	Events		Events	Fleet Hou	ırs per Year:	88,320	hours			Event	
	per	Flight	per	1 🗆	2	. <b>3</b> –	_ 4	Events	Years	per	Fleet Life
	Flight	Hours per	100,000	* \$10M	\$11	<u>1</u> 510	ok -	per	per	Fleet	per
	Hour	Event	Flt Hrs	Catastrophic	Critical	Marginal	Negligible	Year	Event	Life	Event
Frequent <b>A</b>	10 <sup>-3</sup>	1,000	100	1A High	2A	3 <b>A</b>	4A	88.32	0.0113	1,060	0.000944
Probable <b>B</b>		,		1B	2B	3B	4B			·	
Occasional C	10 <sup>-4</sup>	10,000	10	1C	2C Seri	ous O 3C	4C	8.832	0.113	105.98	0.00944
Remote D	10 <sup>-5</sup>	100,000	1	1D	2D	3D	4D	0.8832	1.13	10.598	0.0944
Kemote <b>D</b>	10 <sup>-6</sup>	1,000,000	0.1					0.0883	11.3	1.0598	0.944
Improbable <b>E</b>	10 <sup>-7</sup>	10,000,000	0.01	1E	2E Med		4E	0.00883	113	0.106	9.44
Very Improbable <b>F</b>			0	1F	<b>2F</b> Pr	<b>∞</b> 3F	4F	0		0	5.14
zero Risk <b>0R</b>			v					Ů		U	


## Summary


21

#### **Accidents on a Matrix**

Based on this relationship between mishap risk and mishap loss, we can plot mishap histories on a risk matrix as follows:








## **Summary** Relative Risk Values


## (Clemens)

	Α	В	С	D	Е	F
1	100,000,000	10,000,000	1,000,000	100,000	10,000	1,000
2	10,000,000	1,000,000	100,000	10,000	1,000	100
3	1,000,000	100,000	10,000	1,000	100	10
4	100,000	10,000	1,000	100	10	1


	Α	В	С	D	Е	F
1				500,000	140,000	65,000
2				40,000	6,000	200
3			10,000	7,000	500	40
4				200	10	


#### **Helicopter A**







## **Summary** Hazard Risk Profile










## Summary

#### **Missile Risk Matrix**




#### **Back of the Envelope Calculation**

40,000 Shishkebab Missiles
Delivered over 20 years
Assume all fired
1 accident in 1,000,000 firings

 $\frac{1 \text{ accident}}{1,000,000 \text{ firings}} \times \frac{40,000 \text{ firings}}{20 \text{ years}} = \frac{1 \text{ accident}}{500 \text{ years}}$ 

	1	2	3	4
Α	1,000,000,000	100,000,000	10,000,000	1,000,000
В	100,000,000 10 <sup>2</sup>	10,000,000	1,000,000	100,000
С	10,000,000	1,000,000	100,000	10,000
	10 <sup>-3</sup> 1,000,000	100,000	10,000	1,000
D	100,000	10,000	1,000	100
	10.5 10,000	1,000	100	10
E	1,000	100	10	1



### Take-aways

- High degree of precision? No
- Gets hazards to the correct cell of the matrix
- Confidence that overall assessment ≈ reality
- Helps communicate risk to the risk acceptor
- Very useful for programs with:
  - Reasonably good accident data for analysis
  - A well-designed matrix
- Just one of many tools for managing system safety risk

### **End of Presentation**

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