Business Case for Using a Numbered Logarithmic Risk Severity Scale

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Caveat

Opinions expressed are those of the author and not the coordinated position of AMCOM, Army Materiel Command, the US Army or the Department of Defense. **But maybe** they should be.

Business Case

- Executive Summary (Abstract)
- Introduction
- Problem
- Background
- Scope (4 arenas)
- Desired Outcomes (4)
- Alternatives to be Analyzed (2)
- Analysis of Alternatives
- Conclusion
- Recommendation

Executive Summary

- DoDI 6055.07 actual accidents; MIL-STD-882 potential accidents ۲
 - High dollar & fatality loss Not adequate
 - Top Threshold for damage loss increased,
 - 6055.07 to \$2 million
 882 to \$10 million
 - Both up from \$1 million

 - Threshold for highest injury class remains 1 fatality
 - Systems exceed these values by up to three orders of magnitude
- Solution: •
 - Numbered logarithmic severity scale similar to the Richter Scale
 - Improve the risk management of accidents
 - Enhance DOD operational risk management
 - Deals with National Threats (Presidential Policy Directive 8)
 - Deals with Global threats

DoD's Accident Classification Structure DoD Instruction 6055.07

- **Class A mishap**. The resulting total cost of damages to Government and other property is **\$2 million** or more, a DoD aircraft is destroyed (excluding UAS Groups 1, 2, or 3), or an injury or occupational illness results in a fatality or permanent total disability.
- **Class B mishap**. The resulting total cost of damages to Government and other property is **\$500,000** or more, but less than \$2 million. An injury or occupational illness results in permanent partial disability, or when three or more personnel are hospitalized for inpatient care (which, for mishap reporting purposes only, does not include just observation or diagnostic care) as a result of a single mishap.
- **Class C mishap**. The resulting total cost of property damages to Government and other property is **\$50,000** or more, but less than \$500,000; or a nonfatal injury or illness that results in 1 or more days away from work, not including the day of the injury.
- Class D mishap. The resulting total cost of property damage is \$20,000 or more, but less than \$50,000; or a recordable injury or illness not otherwise classified as a Class A, B, or C mishap.

MIL-STD-882E Severity Categories

| Description | Severity Category | Mishap Result Criteria | | |
|--------------|----------------------|---|--|--|
| Catastrophic | 1 | Could result in one or more of the following: death, permanent total disability, irreversible significant environmental impact, or monetary loss equal to or exceeding \$10M . | | |
| Critical | 2 | Could result in one or more of the following: permanent partial disability, injuries or occupational illness that may result in hospitalization of at least three personnel, reversible significant environmental impact, or monetary loss equal to or exceeding \$1M but less than \$10M. | | |
| Marginal | 3 | Could result in one or more of the following: injury or occupational illness resulting in one or more lost work day(s), reversible moderate environmental impact, or monetary loss equal to or exceeding \$100K but less than \$1M. | | |
| Negligible | 4 | Could result in one or more of the following: injury or occupational illness not resulting in a lost work day, minimal environmental impact, or monetary loss less than \$100K. | | |





Background Class A Accident





Attributes of a good risk assessment matrix

- Severity scale covers full range of possible outcomes
- Probability calibrated with reference to an exposure interval
- Equally proportioned, logarithmic scales (1, 10, 100, 1000...)
- Cartesian Orientation Increase up and to the right
- Risk levels assigned to cells consistent with contours of equal risk (iso-risk contours)
- Sufficient probability or frequency categories so highest severity level can be assessed at the PM level of risk if the probability or frequency of occurrence is low enough
- A risk assessment code for hazards whose risk has been eliminated
- Easily tailored with reporting of risk consistent with other systems within the family of systems.

A common mishap risk assessment matrix for DoD aircraft systems.

| | | | Misha | p Frequency (N | Aishaps per | 100,000 Flig | nt Hrs) | | |
|---------------------|-----------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|--------------|-----------|---------|
| Severity | Impossible I | Near Zero H 0.000 | Rare G 01 0.00 | Remote F 001 0.00 | Low E 1] 0. | Infrequent D 01 0 | Moderate C 1 | High B | Frequer |
| Catastrophic 7 | | | | | | | | | |
| \$2B | 1 K Fatal | - | | | | | - | | |
| Catastrophic 6 | | | | | | | | | |
| \$200M | 100 Fatal | | | | | | • • • • • | ni - mus | |
| Catastrophic 5 | | 1 | | | | | | | |
| \$20M | 10 Fatal | | | | | | | | |
| Catastrophic 4 | | | | | | | | | - |
| \$2M | 1 Fatal | | | 1 | ••••• | | | | |
| Critical 3 | | | | I [| | | | | |
| \$200K | | | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · | 1 1 | | | | | |
| Marginal 2 | | 1 | | | | | | | |
| \$20K | | | | <u>t </u> | | | | <u></u> | |
| Negligible 1 | | | | | | | | | |
| \$2K | | . <u> </u> | | L | | | | | |

Proposed DOD Matrix

| Severity | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
|-----------|------------|--------------------------------|------------------|------------------------------------|-------------|-------------------|--------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| | | ≥\$2k | ≥\$20k | ≥\$200k | ≥\$2M | ≥\$20M | ≥\$200M | ≥\$2B | ≥\$20B |
| Frequency | | Injury, no lost work day | Lost Work Day | Permanent partial disability | ≥1 Fatality | ≥10 Fatalities | ≥100 Fatalities | ≥1,000 Fatalities | ≥10,000 Fatalities |
| Α | >100 | | | | | | | | |
| В | >10 | | | | | | | | |
| С | >1 | | | | | | Proh | ibitive SEC | DEF |
| D | >0.1 | | | | | High | - CAE | | |
| Ε | >0.01 | | | | Serio | us - PEO | | | |
| F | >0.001 | | | Mediur | m - PM | | | | |
| G | >0.0001 | Low – SSW | /G/Principal | for Safety | | | | | |
| Н | >0.00001 | | | | | | | | |
| I | > 0.000001 | | | | | | | | |
| J | ≤ 0.000001 | | | | | | | | |



Scope

<u>Arenas</u>

- DoD Accident Classification and System Safety Risk Assessment
- DOD Operational Risk Management
- National Preparedness
- Global Preparedness

DA Pam 385-30 Standardized Army risk matrix

| | | Probability | | | | | | | |
|--------------|-----|-------------|----------|--------------|----------|------------|--|--|--|
| Severity | | Frequent A | Likely B | Occasional C | Seldom D | Unlikely E | | | |
| | - | | | | | | | | |
| Catastrophic | I | E (1) | E (1) | H (2) | H (2) | M (3) | | | |
| Critical | II | E (1) | H (2) | H (2) | M (3) | L (4) | | | |
| Marginal | 111 | H (2) | M (3) | M (3) | L (4) | L (5) | | | |
| Negligible | IV | M (3) | L (4) | L (4) | L (5) | L (5) | | | |

DA Pam 385–30 Risk acceptance matrix

| | Duration of risk | | | | | | | | |
|------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Category of risk | 1 month or less | Greater than 1 month, less than 1 year | Greater than 1 year, less than 5 years | Permanent or greater than 5 years | Chartered system development programs | | | | |
| Extremely high risk | General officer | MSC CG – General officer | Army Headquarters CG | ASA(I&E) | Component Acquisition Executive (CAE) | | | | |
| High risk | Brigade CO or responsible O-6 | General officer ¹ | MSC CG – General officer | Army Headquarters CG | Program Executive Officer (PEO) | | | | |
| Moderate risk | Battalion CO ¹ or responsible O-5 | Brigade CO ¹ or responsible O-6 | General officer ¹ | General officer ¹ | Program manager | | | | |
| Low risk | Company CO ² or responsible O-3 | Battalion CO ² or responsible O-5 | Brigade CO ¹ or responsible O-6 | Brigade CO ¹ or responsible O-6 | Program manager | | | | |
| Tolerable risk | Not required | Not required | Not required | Not required | Not required | | | | |

U.S. Army Operational Units





Aircraft Hangars at Clark Air Base Destroyed by Ashfall



Mt Rainier & Joint Base Lewis-McChord



Strategic National Risk Assessment (SNRA) (2011) National-Level Events

| Threat/ Hazard Group | Threat/Hazard Type | | | |
|--------------------------|---|--|--|--|
| | Animal Disease Outbreak | | | |
| | Earthquake | | | |
| | Flood | | | |
| | Human Pandemic Outbreak | | | |
| Natural | Hurricane | | | |
| | Space Weather | | | |
| | Tsunami | | | |
| | Volcanic Eruption | | | |
| | Wildfire | | | |
| | Biological Food Contamination | | | |
| Technological/Accidental | Chemical Substance Spill or Release | | | |
| | Dam Failure | | | |
| | Radiological Substance Release | | | |
| | Aircraft as a Weapon | | | |
| | Armed Assault | | | |
| | Biological Terrorism Attack (non-food) | | | |
| | Chemical/Biological Food Contamination Terrorism Attack | | | |
| Adversarial/ Human- | Chemical Terrorism Attack (non-food) | | | |
| Caused | Cyber Attack against Data | | | |
| | Cyber Attack against Physical Infrastructure | | | |
| | Explosives Terrorism Attack | | | |
| | Nuclear Terrorism Attack | | | |
| | Radiological Terrorism Attack | | | |

Global Hazards



Global Hazards*

- Extreme Climate Change
- Nuclear War
- Global Pandemic
- Ecological Catastrophe
- Global System Collapse
- Major Asteroid Impact

- Super-volcano
- Synthetic Biology
- Nanotechnology
- Artificial Intelligence
- Unknown Consequences
- Future Bad Global Governance

Desired Outcomes

- 1. Must support DoD policy regarding the investigation of mishaps and the assessment of environmental, safety, and occupational health hazards for DoD systems
- 2. Must be a useful tool to all levels of DoD leadership in employing risk management for the full range of DoD operations
- Must be useful in support of national preparedness to include managing the risk of all 23 "National-Level Events"
- 4. Must be useful in support of global preparedness.

Alternatives 1

Keep the Status Quo

- Accident classes A, B, C, D
- Severity categories 1, 2, 3, 4
- Increase opposite increasing severity
- Adjust thresholds every 10 to 20 years
 - Small Incremental Changes

Alternative 2

Number severity scales increasing in same direction as increasing severity

- Start numbering with Severity Category 1 for the lowest range of severity
- Add one severity category for each 10 fold increase in severity
- Add categories until full range of potential loss is covered for a specific system.
- Do this for dollar value of damage and for injuries and fatalities
- Eliminate one-word labels (Catastrophic, Critical, Marginal, Negligible)



Analysis of Alternative 1

- 1 Class A Accident
 - Did not increase the Class A rate much
- \$1,400,000,000 (\$1.4 billion)
 - Increased the Air Force dollar-loss to Class A's by a lot



Nimitz Class Aircraft Carrier \$4.5 Billion 5,680 Personnel **Alternative 1**

> Severity 1 Class A

> Severity 1 Class A

Severity 1 Class A



Mother of All Risk Assessment Matrices (Spaceship Earth)



Cost

- Short Term
 - Cost is the same
 - Update publications
 - Update procedures
 - Update database reports
- Long Term
 - Alternative 2 requires no further changes except corrections for inflation which can be automated

Benefits

- Alternative 1
 - None
- Alternative 2
 - Improved comprehension of the significance of all actual or potential high-loss events
 - For leadership
 - For the public

- Just as with the Richter scale for earthquakes

Severity Categories of Big Events



Severity of Historical Events Based on Fatalities



Conclusion

- Current severity scales used in DODI 6055.07 and MIL-STD-882E are not structured to deal with the large costs of DoD systems.
- Top thresholds too low.
- Current reversed letters and numbers make it difficult to adjust the scales to reflect cost realities of present and future systems.
- A logarithmic risk severity scale numbered to increase in the same direction as increasing severity can be used for the full range of environmental, safety and occupational health risk management challenges to include global worst case scenarios for the full range of natural and man-made disasters.

Recommendation

- Begin the transition to the new scale
 - Develop reports and risk assessments based on existing accident and other disastrous event data.
 - This will help to educate today's environmental, safety and occupational health risk management personnel and others dealing with these kinds of events on the utility of this tool.
 - It will also help calibrate the thinking of all government leaders on the meaning of risk assessment in the same way that the Richter Scale helped the scientific community and general public of the 1930s to comprehend the nature of earthquake severity data.

Questions?

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